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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case comes to the Court pursuant to Utah R. App. Procedure 41 certification 
by Judge Dee V. Benson of the United States District Court, District of Utah. This Court 
accepted certification on January 23, 2009 and jurisdiction is appropriate under Utah 
Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(l) (West 2008). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"A certified question from the federal district court does not present us with a 
decision to affirm or reverse a lower court's decision; as such, traditional standards of 
review do not apply. On certification, we answer the legal questions presented without 
resolving the underlying dispute."1 
Question Certified for Determination 
This Court accepted certification of the following question: 
"Whether provision of lower limits for underinsured motorist coverage than for liability 
coverage, properly complies with former Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-305(9)(b) and 
31A-22-305(9)(g) (currently codified under Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305.3)." 
Relevant Statutes. Rules and Constitutional Provisions 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9): 
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1,2001, the limits of 
underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits 
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured 
1
 Egbert v. Nissan North America, Inc., 2007 UT 64, ^ 7, 167 P.3d 1058. 
1 
motorist coverage limits available2 by the insurer under the insured's motor 
vehicle policy, unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount 
by signing an acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage. 
(g)(i) [i]n conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after 
January 1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall 
disclose . . . an explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist 
coverage and the costs associated with increasing the coverage in amounts 
up to and including the maximum amount available by the insurer under the 
insured's motor vehicle policy.3 
The complete statute is attached as Addendum "A." 
Statement of the Case 
Historical Changes To Policies Issued by State Farm Over the Course of 24 Years. 
During their 24 year relationship with the Iversons State Farm issued new policy 
numbers at crucial points, such as: termination, time-out-of-force, changes in vehicles, 
and a complete substitution of one Policy Form for a new Policy Form. (Addendum "B" 
Table Policy Chronology). State Farm first issued a policy of insurance to Carter and 
Glenada Iverson in 1981. (R. 0201). State Farm's first policy provided coverage for a 
1981 Pontiac Firebird and was numbered #479 7848-804-4. In 1990 State Farm State 
2
 State Farm has not argued and it is undisputed that higher amounts were available 
under the policy. 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305 (West 2001)(currently codified under Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-305.3)(emphasis added). 
2 
Farm "replaced" policy #479 7848-804-44 and issued policy #479 7848-804-44A which 
governed a 1984 Dodge Van. (R. 0201). 
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From 1991 through 2005, State Farm replaced the prior policy on numerous 
occasions and ultimately issued new policy numbers ranging from #479 7848-804-44A to 
#479 7848-804-44F. (R. 201, 228, Addendum "B" Table Policy Chronology). In 1997 
the Iversons experienced a "Time Out of Force," resulting in State Farm issuing #479 
7848-804-44B. Then, in 1997, State Farm terminated the policy. (R. 202, 228, 230). 
When reinstating coverage, State Farm issued policy #479 7848-804-44C, replacing the 
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Similarly, whenever the Iversons acquired a new vehicle, State Farm's 
documentation shows that they issued new coverage. State Farm paperwork treated the 
policy as a 'replacement' (R. 201, 204), and issued a new policy number to coincide with 
the new coverage for the new vehicle (R. 201 [1984 Dodge Van para 2]; R. 203, 232 
[1995 Chevy Van]; R. 204 [2001 PT Cruiser]).4 For example, in October 1997, State 
Farm issued policy #479 7848-804-44D for the newly acquired 1995 Chevy Van, 
replacing the previous coverage under policy #479 7848-804-44C. (R. 203, 232). 
From the beginning of their relationship, State Farm told the Iversons that their 
policy "consists of [declarations], any ; 
!- COU^Jt&JGNED. 
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According to State Farm's ^ • J.V«T-*,* *£?-•' *>A*I»>fe— 
corporate representative Tammy Chase (R. 304), in August 2001 State Farm replaced the 
Iverson's Policy Booklet Form 9844.3 (R. 355-377) with State Farm's new Policy 
4
 State Farm may attempt to characterize the multiple change in vehicles over the 
years as nothing more than providing coverage for a 'replacement' vehicle. In the 
Federal Court action, State Farm cited their renewal notices and argued that these were 
mere replacement vehicles. However, the notices lack any indication that State Farm 
simply added the vehicle onto an "existing policy." (R. 202). 
4 
Booklet Form 9844.4 (R. 379-408). Reflecting this change to basic terms, definitions and 
conditions to the Iverson's contracted coverage, State Farm replaced policy #479 
7848-804-44D with #479 7848-804-44E. (R. 304). The effective date for Utah Code 
Ann. §31A-22-305, January 1, 2001, precedes State Farm's issuance of new terms, 
definitions and conditions in August of 2001. However, after issuing a new policy with 
altered terms, conditions and definitions for the Iverson's policy, State Farm did not 
obtain a written waiver of UIM coverage equal to liability limits. (R. 204). 
The Policy Form issued by State Farm is an "agreement" by and between State 
Farm and their insured. According to State Farm: "We, the State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company, agree to insure you according to the terms of this policy 
based: 1. on your payment of premium for the coverages you chose, and 2. in reliance on 
your statements in these declarations." (R. 382, 352). The Policy continues: "You agree, 
by acceptance of this policy that: 1. the statements in these declarations are your 
statements and are true; and 2. we insure you on the basis your statements are true; and 3. 
this policy contains all of the agreements between you and us or any of our agents." (R. 
382, 352) 
Further, under the Policy Form, the "terms of the policy may only be changed or 
waived only by: (1) an 'endorsement'... or, (2) the revision of policy form to give 
broader coverage." (R. 404)(emphasis added). However, the new Policy Form narrowed 
the coverages and substantially altered the terms and conditions. First, the new policy 
provisions altered the definition of "bodily injury," expressly eliminating coverage for 
5 
emotional distress where no physical injury occurred. (R. 300, and Addendum "C" Table 
Policy Language). Other substantive changes in coverage, changes which narrowed the 
coverage available included: (1) redefining the nature of coverage for rental vehicles used 
by the insured (R. 356, 381 Addendum "C" Table Policy Language); (2) removed no-fault 
coverage "while operating or occupying a motorcycle" (R. 363, 389, Addendum "C" 
Table Policy Language); (3) eliminated ability of insured to recover attorney fees when 
electing arbitration for dispute over no-fault benefits (R. 389, Addendum "C" Table 
Policy Language); and, (4) gave State Farm right to rely on mailing as sufficient proof of 
notice. (R. 405, Addendum "C" Table Policy Language). 
The new policy also altered the definition of 'newly acquired car.' (R. 356, 
Addendum "C" Table Policy Language). Under the original terms of the contract 
between State Farm and the Iversons, State Farm would provide coverage for a new 
vehicle if "(1) [the Iversons] tell us about it within 30 days after its delivery to you; (2) if 
you or your spouse has more than one of our car policies, tell us which one is to apply; 
and, (3) pay us any added amount due." (Id.)(emphasis added). 
Under the new terms, State Farm would provide coverage for a new vehicle only if 
the Iversons "(1) ask u$ to insure it within 30 days after its delivery to you; and (2) pay 
us any added amount due." (R. 380)(emphasis added). Under the new provisions, the 
Iversons had to ask State Farm for insurance coverage. State Farm could then decide 
whether or not to issue coverage and whether a new policy would be issued. Under the 
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terms of this new policy, State Farm subsequently supplied a new policy of insurance for 
a 2001 PT Cruiser. 
In 2003 the Iversons acquired a PT Cruiser. They asked State Farm to provide 
coverage for the vehicle. (R. 204,257). State Farm issued policy #479 7848-804-44F for 
the coverage on the PT Cruiser, replacing the prior policy #479 7848-804-44E. (R. 204, 
259). State Farm sent a Declarations Page for the PT Cruiser to the Iversons. Under 
"IMPORTANT MESSAGES" State Farm informed the Iversons that policy #479 
7848-804-44F "Replaced policy number 4797848-44E." (R. 204, 259). 
b M g O R T A N T M { ^ & < ^ 
Your policy ccnabta of this declarations page, the policy booklet - form 9844,4, and any endorsements that apply, including 
those issues to you with any subsequent renewal rofcce, 
Replaced pclicy number 4797848-44E. 
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State Farm's Declarations Page further juxtaposes and differentiates between 
'replacement' insurance coverage as opposed to 'renewal' insurance coverage by telling 
the insured that future coverage under the new policy will be governed by any 
endorsements which apply to "subsequent renewals." (Id.)(emphasis added). At the time 
State Farm replaced #479 7848-804-44E with policy #479 7848-804-44F they did not 
obtain a waiver for UIM coverage in an amount less than the liability policy limits. 
Over the course of 24 years State Farm issued new policies when the Iversons 
purchased a new vehicle, experienced a "Time Out of Force" or when State Farm issued a 
new policy altogether. State Farm's consistent and habitual issuance of a new policy 
number following a Time Out of Force, Termination/Reinstatement of coverage, 
7 
replacing policies to cover new vehicles and alteration of the contractual terms and 
agreement through a new Policy Booklet Form demonstrate the creation of a new policy, 
not a renewal of the same continuous and uninterrupted coverage. 
State Farm's Corporate Representative Confirmed Policy Changes, 
State Farm's designated corporate representative, Tammy Chase, testified that 
underwriting involves a two-step process. 
Q. So it's a two-step process to go through underwriting. 
A. Right. 




Q. Thank you. And the second step is the rating of the risk. 
A. Yes. 
(R. 205, 238-239, 320-321). 
Q. All right. So we've described two steps in the underwriting process, 
eligibility and then the second step is rating of placement. Are there other 
steps beyond those? 
A. No. 
(R. 205, 241, 320-321). 
In the second step of underwriting, determining the rating, State Farm considers 
the type of vehicle, the coverages, deductibles, where the car is used, the territory, the 
classification of the car, how the car is used (commuter/business/pleasure etc.) and the 
age of the operator. (R. 205, 240). State Farm also admits that there is a difference in 
rating, the second step of underwriting, for a 1981 Firebird as opposed to a 2001 PT 
8 
Cruiser. "Q. So there's a change in underwriting between a 1981 Firebird and a 2003 PT 
Cruiser; is that accurate? A. There's a change in rating." (Id. at 23:11-14).5 
State Farm will likely point out that insureds derive an alleged 'benefit' by 
characterizing old policies as 'the same' policy even when significant rating changes 
result in issuance of new policy numbers. Specifically, State Farm suggests that insureds 
receive a lower premium rate simply by calling the policy 'the same.' However, contrary 
to a supposed 'benefit' to the insured in maintaining the same policy, Tammy Chase 
admits that there is no guarantee of continuing discounts and that, in any case, State Farm 
must follow the rates it has on file. (R. 205, 244-245). Ms. Chase agreed that there 
might, in fact, be no benefit whatsoever to the insured. 
Q. Is it always the case that if State Farm writes a new policy, the premium, 
the cost of that policy is going to be greater than if it were simply renewed? 
A. No. 
Q. So the benefit that you're talking about doesn't always accompany the 
renewal. 
A. It's possible that it wouldn't, that it could be the same. 
(See, 244). 
Additionally, the change in policy numbers from policy to policy is important in 
determining what coverages and declarations exist for the policy. State Farm admits that 
the issuance of a new policy number is used to "identify which declarations page would 
be in effect." (R. 205, 245). Furthermore, any change in principal drivers would trigger 
both an eligibility and a rating review. (R. 206, 246-247). For example, a change from a 
5
 State Farm also admitted that the 'class changes' to the Iverson's insurance 
constituted rating changes. (R. 205, 228, 242-243). 
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married to an unmarried male driver would reflect a change in the second step of 
underwriting, the rating of the policy. 
Q. The underwriting risks change with age; Is that right? 
A. Yes. This was an unmarried male, age 25 to 29, so that corresponds 
with our class 3. 
Q. So itfs a change in the underwriting on the policy as well as a change in 
principal driver. 
A. It's a change in the rating of the policy. The classification is part of the 
rate. 
Q. And then the very next page, deposition exhibit no. 3, Page number 
1524, we see another change reflected in the principal driver. It says there 
are no male or unmarried female drivers under age 25. Is that accurate 
what iVe just said? 
A. Yes. That's what that says. 
Q. And again that would affect the second step of the underwriting 
process, the rating. 
A. It would impact the rating, the pricing of the policy, yes. 
(R. 206,248-250). Here, State Farm's policy underwent just such a change when the 
principal driver changed from Carter Iverson to his son, Rex Iverson in 1997-1998. (R. 
88, 92) and the premium increased from $162.90 to $350.02. 
Finally, State Farm admits that even when there is no change at all to the policy 
number, there may still be material changes to the policy and that material changes are 
those which "impact the pricing of the policy." (R. 206). 
Q. You would agree that the change in principal driver is — in fact, I think 
you already agreed when we were talking earlier that the changing of 
principal driver is a material change that's going to affect the premiums and 
risk involved in the policy; Isn't that true? 
A. It would impact the pricing of that policy. 
Q. So it's not an immaterial change. 
A. Even just changing a driver, though, would not create even a change to 
that change code. 
Q. But if it changed in matters with respect to the cost of the policy? 
10 
A. To the pricing of the policy, yes. 
Q. So it's a change that materially affects the policy then; Is that true? 
A. Depending on the age of the driver, the driving record, it may or 
may not impact the pricing. It could have potential. 
Q. So it could be a material change. 
A. Right. 
Q. In fact, with the change of the driver in this case, it did, with the change 
in principal driver, it did change the costs, didn't it? I guess that would be 
reflected by the documents, wouldn't it? 
A. Yes. 
(R. 206, 254-255). 
In this case, State Farm documents reflect that the change in principal drivers did, 
in fact, alter the pricing of the policy and hence were material to the policy. In February 
of 1997 the principal driver was aged 50 or older and the premium was $162.90. (R. 207, 
232-234,). Yet, one year later, the principal driver was an unmarried male age 25-29 and 
the premium was more than double the year before at $350.02. (R. 207). Further, the 
change in vehicles also altered the pricing and, according to Ms. Chase, therefore 
constitutes a material change in the insurance policy. In February of 2003 the total 
premium for the 1995 Chevy Van was $277.20. (R. 207, 261). Yet, after replacing #479 
7848-804-44E, the policy covering the Chevy Van, with #479 7848-804-44F, the policy 
covering the PT Cruiser, the pricing jumped to $379.00. (R. 207). 
From 1981 through 2005 State Farm insured four different vehicles under differing 
policy numbers, two different principal drivers and issued new policy numbers on three 
different occasions following a termination, "Time Out of Force," or rewriting of the 
terms and conditions in the Policy Booklet Form. (Addendum "C" Table Policy 
11 
Language). State Farm admits that the insurance issued to Carter and Glenada Iverson 
changed frequently: 
Q. Has gone through numerous changes. That's true? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. It's had different principal drivers. 
A. Correct. 
Q. It's had principal drivers who differ in terms of a risk assessment? I'm 
speaking to the 23 to 25 year age range and unmarried. That's correct? 
A. Okay. 
Q. It's had four different vehicles on it. 
A. Correct. 
Q. The premiums have differed for those vehicles. 
A. Correct. 
Q. The entire policy number itself has not remained the same over the 
course of the policy? 
A. I would say that the policy number has and that the change code has 
differed. 
Q. I understand the distinction but if you read the policy number as a 
whole, it changes over the course of time.... That last number on the policy 
changes, letter. 
A. The last letter, the change code can change, yes.6 
(R. 252-253) 
State Farm produced no evidence that they obtained a written waiver from from Carter or 
Glenada Iverson allowing the UIM coverage to be less than the liability coverage. 
In July of 2005, Carter and Glenada Iverson were killed in a head-on collision 
while driving the 2001 Chrysler PT Cruiser. Joni Iverson, as personal representative of 
the heirs and estate Carter and Glenada, requested that State Farm provide UIM coverage 
6
 Ms. Chase's testimony does equivocate that this is simply a 'change code' but the 
fact remains that the policy number, as a whole, changes to reflect the issuance of 
coverage for a vehicle not previously covered or to identify reinstatement/recovery from 
a time-out-of-force, temporary suspension of coverage or issuance of a new policy. 
12 
in an amount equal to the liability policy limits of $50,000/$ 100,000. State Farm refused 
to provide the higher limits. (R. 152). State Farm argues that, despite the numerous 
changes and passage of 24 years, the policy of insurance covering the 1981 Firebird is the 
'same' policy of insurance, simply a 'renewal/ covering the 2001 PT Cruiser. 
Summary of the Argument 
State Farm characterizes a policy of insurance written in 1981 and covering a 1981 
Firebird as the 'same' policy issued in 2003 and covering a 2001 PT Cruiser. Besides the 
obvious fact that neither the PT Cruiser nor the policy of insurance existed at the time 
State Farm wrote coverage in 1981, the myriad changes and circumstances demonstrate 
that the Iverson's coverage changed materially after the legislature enacted a written 
waiver requirement. 
State Farm's Policy Did Not Exist on January 1,2001. 
The policy of insurance governing the 2001 PT Cruiser did not exist until 2003 
when State Farm issued Policy #479 7848-804-44F to replace the prior policy #479 
7848-804-44E. Additionally, even the preceding Policy #479 7848-804-44E did not exist 
until August 2001 when State Farm issued a new Policy Form. Because the policy of 
insurance covering the Iversons did not exist prior to January 1, 2001, Utah Code 
31A-22-3 09(b) mandates that State Farm obtain a written waiver of UIM coverage equal 
to the liability coverage. State Farm never secured a written waiver from the Iversons. 
Accordingly, the UIM coverage must equal the liability coverage, in this case $50,000 per 
person and $100,000 per occurrence. 
13 
State Farm's Policy Is Not A 'Renewal' of Previously Existing Coverage. 
The sole exception for obtaining written waivers from insureds is in the case of a 
renewal. However, a policy of insurance written for the first time in 2003 cannot be 
considered 'renewal' insurance. State Farm believes that a policy originally written in 
1981, providing coverage for a 1981 Firebird, is the same policy governing a 2001 PT 
Cruiser, written in 2003 and in force at the time of a collision in 2005. State Farm takes 
this position in order to argue that the policy was simply 'renewed9 over the years. 
State Farm takes an extreme position that, despite four changes in automobiles, 
two changes in primary operator and at least two occasions where the coverage was 
considered to be "Time Out of Force" the policy of insurance is the 'same' and therefore 
simply a 'renewal.' Indeed, State Farm replaced the entire policy terms, conditions, 
declarations and coverage in August of 2001 and issued a new number reflecting those 
changes as well. Yet, State Farm cannot explain why their own written materials sent to 
the insureds indicate that State Farm was 'replacing,' not renewing, a policy which had 
lapsed or on which the vehicles had been changed. 
In light of these facts, State Farm did not simply 'renew' a previously valid policy. 
Rather, State Farm replaced the policy in existence, with a new policy, as reflected by the 
policy number itself. When a light bulb bums out, the light bulb is replaced, meaning 
that a new lightbulb is substituted for the one which no longer functions or exists. State 
Farm's position, however, seems to be that so long as the power company remains the 
same, the light bulb never changes. 
14 
L STATE FARM'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN A WRITTEN WAIVER WHEN 
ISSUING NEW COVERAGE AFTER 2001 REQUIRES THAT UIM LIMITS 
EQUAL THE LIABILITY LIMITS. 
For all new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, underinsured motorist 
coverage equals the liability coverage unless the insured affirmatively waives, in writing, 
the right to matching UIM coverage.7 
The operative statute provided in relevant part: 
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1,2001, the limits of 
underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits 
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured 
motorist coverage limits available8 by the insurer under the insured's motor 
vehicle policy, unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount 
by signing an acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage.9 
State Farm issued Policy #479 7848-804-44F covering the PT Cruiser in April of 
2003. State Farm "replaced" former Policy #479 7848-804-44E with #479 
7848-804-44F. (R. 327). 
No evidence of record indicates that State Farm obtained the written waivers after 
'replacing' the prior policy as required by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305. Accordingly, 
7
 Utah Code does allow an insurer to issue UIM for amounts less than liability 
coverage, but only so long as that amount is the maximum offered by the insurer under 
the policy. 
8
 State Farm has not argued and it is undisputed that higher amounts were available 
under the policy. 
9
 Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305.3(2)(b)(emphasis added). The statutory provision 
written in 2000 and in effect as of 2001 was numbered § 31A-22-305(9)(b) but was 
renumbered in 2001 without substantive change. 
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Your policy ccnsbfci of thin declarations page, the policy booklet - form 9844.4, and any endorsements that apply, including 
those issued to you with any subsequent renewal rofcce, 
( Replaced pobcy number 47978*8-<4E. 
mmmmmmmmmmmm* JI '• " ^ vmmmimm*mmmmmmmm^ 
the UIM coverage under Policy #479 7848-804-44F must equal the liability coverage on 
the Iverson PT Cruiser, $50,000/$ 100,000. 
The legislature provided a single exception to the requirement that insureds waive 
UIM in writing - existing policies which were renewed did not require a written waiver 
under the 2000 legislation. For renewal policies in existence on January 1, 2001, the 
insurer only needed to provide a notice to the insured explaining UIM coverage. 
However, the exception only applies to policies existing on January 1, 2001. State Farm 
relies on this exception in attempting to show compliance with the statutory 
requirements. 
(g)(i) [i]n conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after 
January 1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall 
disclose . . . an explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist 
coverage and the costs associated with increasing the coverage in amounts 
up to and including the maximum amount available by the insurer under the 
insured's motor vehicle policy.10 
Unfortunately, the policy controlling coverage over the PT Cruiser did not exist on 
January 1, 2001 and, therefore, any renewal notifications fail to meet the strict legislative 
requirements.11 As demonstrated by the undisputed facts in this case, State Farm Policy 
#479 7848-804-44F "replaced" the prior policy #479 7848-804-44E in April 2003. 
10
 Id. (emphasis added). 
11
 The New Oxford American Dictionary (Second Edition) defines existing as "in 
existence or operation at the time under consideration." 
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Accordingly, #479 7848-804-44 which insured the PT Cruiser did not exist until April of 
2003, a full two years after the statute went into effect. 
Further, the preceding policy, State Farm Policy #479 7848-804-44E did not exist 
until August of 2001. State Farm wrote policy number #479 7848-804-44E in order to 
establish the new terms, definitions and conditions contained in Policy Booklet Form 
9844.4. The only policy of insurance "existing on [January 1, 2001]" was Policy #479 
7848-804-44D. State Farm Policy #479 7848-804-44D was subject to the prior terms, 
conditions and definitions contained in Policy Booklet Form 9844.3. State Farm wrote a 
new policy by issuing #479 7848-804-44E and incorporating the new Policy Booklet 
Form. Because State Farm Policy #479 7848-804-44F did not exist on January 1, 2001, it 
cannot be considered a 'renewal' policy. 
State Farm told insureds in the declaration under "IMPORTANT MESSAGES" 
that policy #479 7848-804-44F "Replaced policy number 4797848-44E." (See, 204, 
258-259). If the policy did not previously exist and was written as a replacement policy, 
then it can be nothing other than a new policy. By contrast, State Farm does not tell the 
Iversons that the PT Cruiser replaced a Chevy Van. Holding that the policy issued in 
1982 governing a Firebird is the same policy of insurance governing a 2001 PT Cruiser 
and issued in 2003 grants State Farm the power to wholly dictate the characterization of 
its insurance without deference to the legislative requirements or the undisputed facts. 
When an insurer writes insurance for new circumstances, or writes an insurance 
contract to alter the terms of the original contract, the insurer has created a 'new' policy, 
17 
not a renewal policy, and must therefore obtain the statutorily mandated written waiver 
from the insured regarding the amount of accepted UIM coverage.12 An insurance policy 
written to provide coverage on a new vehicle, a new principal driver or to alter the 
substantive terms of the agreement is not a 'renewal,9 but rather a replacement policy as 
demonstrated by State Farm's identification of a new policy number and express 
characterization of the policy as "replacement."13 
Renewal is commonly defined as "the action of extending the period of validity of 
a license, subscription, or contract."14 In other words, 'renewal' assumes that the original 
contract was in existence and simply "came up for renewal."15 By contrast, replace is 
defined as "take the place of: provide or find a substitute for (something that is broken, 
old, or inoperative)."16 When writing the contract for purposes of a new vehicle, State 
Farm's own records and documents describe the coverage provided to the Iversons as 
'replacement' coverage, not renewal coverage. Because the insurance contract between 
the Iversons and State Farm was written on several occasions, it simply cannot be said 
that the contract that existed between the Iversons and State Farm in 1981 is the same 
continuous renewal contract of insurance covering their collision in 2005. 
12
 Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305.3(2)(b) (West 2008). 
13
 See, Statement of Facts, supra fflf 2,21. 
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II. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE REQUIRES THAT STATE 
FARM'S POLICY BE CONSIDERED NEW, NOT A RENEWAL. 
When interpreting statutory insurance requirements the primary goal is "to evince 
the true intent and purpose of the Legislature... by first looking to the statute's plain 
language, and giving effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous."17 
The plain language approach also requires that this Court must "presume that the 
legislature used each word in a statute advisedly and we give effect to each term 
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning."18 In matters of insurance coverage, 
Utah Courts give deference to the public policy and compensatory goals of insurance by 
requiring that any exceptions to coverage be strictly and narrowly construed. UIM 
"statutes are remedial in nature, requiring that they be liberally construed in favor of 
coverage, with strict and narrow construction given to exclusions."19 
The plain language of the statute requires waivers for "new policies written on or 
after January 1, 2001." However, in order to avoid the statutory requirements of 
providing higher UIM coverage, State Farm reads words into the statute which do not 
exist. State Farm reads the statute as "for all new policies wttderwritten." No such 
language exists in the statute and this Court would go well beyond the plain language of 
the statute in construing it to include such language. The legislature carefully chose that 
17
 Li v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 2006 UT 80 f 9, 150 P.3d 471. 
18
 A/, at H 21. 
19
 General Security Indent. Co. of Arizona v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109 % 13, 158 R3d 
1121. 
19 
the policy need only be 'written,' not underwritten, in order to require insurers provide 
higher UIM coverage or obtain a waiver. Because the legislature chose the word 
'written' over 'underwritten,' State Farm's position that this is not a new policy quickly 
loses viability. 
Additionally, the plain language of Utah's statute provides a single narrow 
exception to obtaining a waiver from an insured. Under the statute, renewal policies 
existing at the time of January 1, 2001 only needed to provide an additional notice to 
insureds regarding UIM coverage. No policy of insurance existed which governed the 
PT Cruiser until April of 2003. State Farm's approach would read out of existence the 
'existing at the time' language of Utah's statute. Courts must "avoid interpretations that 
will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative."20 Despite this firmly 
entrenched principle of statutory construction, State Farm attempts to read out the 
'existing at the time' phrase in Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305.3. 
In order to fit within the renewal exception, State Farm's interpretation expands 
renewal to include substitution, reinstatement, replacement or any number of other forms 
a new policy might take, so long as some vague "internal operation" of the insurance 
company considered the policy as a renewal. It is highly unlikely that the legislature 
intended to leave it to the discretion of individual insurance companies to brand their 
policies as 'new' or 'renewal' based solely on internal operations. In briefing to the 
Federal District Court, State Farm cited authority allegedly supporting their broad 
20
 Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, % 9, 173 P.3d 166. 
20 
interpretation of the statute. However, that authority cannot guide this Court due to the 
disparate differences in statutory language addressed in those decisions. 
For example, Millet v. Imperial Fire and Casualty Insurance interpreted a much 
different statute. There, the statute addressed increased UIM requirements "when a 
renewal, reinstatement, substitute, or amended policy is issued to the same named insured 
by the same insurer or any of its affiliates."21 Clearly, this statute is much broader than 
Utah's - the Utah legislature chose to allow an exception to written waivers only for 
renewals, not for 'reinstatements, substitutes, amendments.' Not surprisingly, the Millet 
court found in favor of the insurance company under the Louisiana statute. Indeed, each 
authority relied upon by State Farm similarly dealt with such broad statutory language.22 
Utah law requires that the construction and application of the 'renewal' exception 
to written waiver be done narrowly, giving full effect to each word used, including the 
"then existing" language. Because Policy #479 7848-804-44F did not exist until 2003, it 
21
 Millet v. Imperial Fire and Casualty Insurance, 887 So.2d 603, 605 (La. Ct. App.) 
22
 See, Gasch v. Harris, 808 So.2d 1260 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002)(UIM "coverage or suet 
higher uninsured motorist limits need not be provided in or supplemental to any other 
policy which renews, extends, changes, supersedes, or replaces an existing policy with 
the same bodily injury liability limits when an insured or lessee had rejected the 
coverage." Florida Statutes Ann. § 627.727 (West 2008)); and, Dodd v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
99 P.3d 1219, 1222, n. 4 (Okla. Civ. App. 204)(no written waiver required for UIM "in or 
supplemental to any renewal, reinstatement, substitute, amended or replacement 
policy."); and, Johnson v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 817 P.2d 841, 843, n. 2 (Wash 
1991)("such coverage shall not be included in any supplemental or renewal policy unless 
a named insured or spouse subsequently requests such coverage in writing."); and, Wells 
v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Insurance Exchange, 185 N.W.2d 147, 149 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) 
(UIM coverage "need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal policy" but also 
refusing to address issue under a constitutional ex post facto analysis). 
21 
cannot be considered a 'renewal' policy. The Utah legislature, unlike other states, chose 
to narrowly define the circumstances under which an insurer may simply given notice to 
the insured regarding UIM benefits. Other states broadly defined the notice 
circumstances as including any supplemental, replacement, or superseding policies and 
did not even specify that those policies needed to be "then existing."23 If the state 
legislature desired to allow replacement polices to be subject to the simple notice 
procedure, the legislature could have adopted language identical to that in other state 
systems. Utah requires that insurers obtain a written waiver for all new policies written 
after January 1, 2001 and the policy covering the PT Cruiser, being written in 2003, is 
such a policy. Because Policy #479 7848-804-44F was written in 2003, State Farm must 
provide coverage equal to the liability limits of $50,000/$ 100,00. 
III. PUBLIC POLICY AND OTHER STATE COURTS REQUIRE THAT STATE 
FARM PROVIDE UIM COVERAGE EQUAL TO THE LIABILITY COVERAGE. 
A. Legislative History and the Underlying Public Policy Require Any 
Ambiguity Between 'Renewal' and 'New' Construed In Favor of Coverage 
Equaling the Liability Limits. 
"When interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent 
and purpose."24 "If we find the provision ambiguous, we then seek guidance from the 
legislative history and relevant policy considerations."25 Even if the statute contained 




 Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, If 9, 173 P.3d 166. 
25
 Wilcox v. CSX Corp., 2003 UT 21,1J8, 70 P.3d 85. 
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"renewal" policy or a "new" policy, the legislative history and public policy undermine 
any finding that State Farm can escape providing hiring limits under the renewal 
exception. 
The public policy underlying the legislative mandate of UIM limits equal to, at the 
very least, the liability limits was intended to eliminate confiision and provide the greatest 
coverage possible for insureds. In a 2007 Utah Court of Appeals case, the opinion 
undertook a review of the legislative history and policy giving rise to the requirement that 
insurers such as State Farm obtain a written waiver for lower UIM limits. "The 
legislative policy reflected [by Uninsured/Underinsured coverage] is to ensure that 
consumers make fully informed decisions about UM coverage, not to give insurers an 
out."26 The Utah Court of Appeals recognized that the statutory changes in 2000 cured a 
legislative concern: consumers lacked adequate information and understanding regarding 
their underinsured and uninsured coverages. According to Representative Koehn: 
When we buy insurance for our cars, and we purchase the amount that we can 
refer to as the "liability amount," ... consumers generally don't understand that 
that's a package that you buy, and they believe that when they're buying that 
coverage, that's taking care of themselves or their family. That's not the case.... 
What this bill does is says, when you're purchasing insurance ... the underinsured 
coverage will be the same as the liability coverage you have, unless you choose 
not to take that. But what [the bill] presumes, is that the levels will be the same, so 
that the consumer gets what they believe they're buying, or they understand what 
they're buying, and ... it provides a way that if you don't want that, then you can 
26
 General Security Indem. Co. of Arizona v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109 f^ 9, n. 4 
(construing Utah's uninsured provisions by reference to legislative debate regarding 
Utah's underinsured statutes). 
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sign a waiver saying "I recognize Fm taking a lesser amount of underinsured 
coverage."27 
When the Iversons purchased insurance in April of 2003 for their 2001 PT Cruiser, they 
purchased liability coverage in an amount of $50,000/$ 100,000. 
State Farm ignores the legislative finding that insureds must be protected by 
mandating the higher limits absent a written acceptance of lower limits because the 
insureds simply didn't know what they were getting when purchasing insurance. State 
Farm should not be allowed to so easily skirt legislative intent by portraying a policy 
written after this legislative amendment as a renewal based on nothing more than 
reference to State Farm's own internal procedures. "To allow a statutory exemption on 
the basis of the form of the transaction and the documentation involved - matters solely 
within the control of the insurer - is to allow the application of the statute to be controlled 
by the insurer."28 
Underinsured and uninsured statutes: 
are designed to protect insureds by providing compensation to those who 
are injured or killed by uninsured motorists or other financially 
irresponsible motorists. Such statutes are remedial in nature, requiring that 
they be liberally construed in favor of coverage, with strict and narrow 
construction given to exclusions. UM statutes are designed for the benefit 
of insureds and not insurers. They are adopted to benefit the insured 
motorist, and are not intended to relieve ... insurers of primary 
27
 A i a t l l l . 
28
 Folstad v Farmers Insurance, 210 N. W.2d 238, 240 (Minn. 1973)(refusing to 
allow insurer to characterize policy as 'renewal' where changes in driver and insured 
vehicles occur). 
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responsibility ... or to benefit them in any way.29 
State Farm did not cite a single decision in the Federal briefing where an insurance 
coverage lapsed or experienced a "Time Out of Force," and was reissued and replaced, 
but was still considered as a 'renewal' policy. Further, State Farm cites no authority 
wherein the insurer expressly defined and identified the new policy as "replacing" a prior 
policy and, thereafter, the policy was considered a renewal. Finally, and as noted above, 
those few decisions cited by State Farm are distinguishable based on broad statutory 
language which excepted the policy from mandatory higher UIM coverage. In light of 
the Utah legislature's expressed public policy to 'protect insureds' and the very narrow 
use of language allowing insurers to escape a written waiver, State Farm's position that 
they need not obtain a written waiver for lapsed coverage and replacement policies fails. 
Other courts examining the issue readily conclude that a replacement policy is the 
equivalent of a 'new' policy. In Whaley v. Allstate Ins, Co,, the court held that "the Policy 
was not a 'renewal' but a new or replacement policy on October 9, 1981, when Mr. 
Whaley substituted a 1981 Chevette for a 1980 Chevette."30 Similarly, in Withrow v. 
Pickard, the court recognized "that the addition of a vehicle to an existing policy 
constitutes a new policy distinct from the original... We also agree with Withrow that a 
new policy was created when he added a third vehicle to his original policy."31 Here, 
29
 General Security Indent, Co. of Arizona v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109 ^  13, 158 P.3d 
1121 (citation and quotation omitted). 
30
 Whaley v. Allstate Ins, Co,, 595 F.Supp. 1023, 1026 (D.C. Del. 1984). 
31
 Withrow v, Pickard, 905 P.2d 800, 803 (Okla. 1995). 
25 
State Farm's own documents indicate that the insurance policies have replaced each other 
on several occasions when bringing coverage to a new vehicle. The final policy 
governing the PT Cruiser did not exist prior to April of 2003 and, because it cannot be a 
renewal if it did not previously exist, it must therefore be considered a new policy under 
Utah law. 
Because a 'renewal' is to be strictly and narrowly construed in light of public 
policy considerations requiring a broad construction advancing coverage for benefit of 
insureds, other jurisdictions reject contentions that would take a recently issued policy 
outside of increased coverage. For instance, in Beauchamp v. Southwestern Nat'I Ins. 
Co., the court ruled that a similar statutory scheme is "strictly limited to true renewals of 
existing insurance policies, that is, situations where such renewals are made without 
effecting a material change or departure from the provisions of the original policy."32 
Beauchamp concluded that, as a necessary result of the public policy in favor of 
coverage, the addition of a 1974 Jeep took the coverage outside a 'true renewal' and 
imposed statutory requirements for UIM. Relying on Beauchamp, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals paid heed to the "admonition to read [renewal exception] narrowly."33 
In May, the court found that a reduction in liability coverage amount took the insurance 
coverage outside the scope of a mere 'renewal.'34 Adopting State Farm's attempt to 
32
 Beauchamp v. Southwestern Nat'I Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 673, 676 (Okla. 1987). 
33





characterize the 24 year old policy as a mere renewal would frustrate the important policy 
considerations that prompted the Utah legislature to abolish the written rejection 
exception. 
The express public policy of the State of Utah is that UIM statutes are designed for 
the benefit of insureds and not insurers. Mandatory UIM equal to the liability limits, 
absent written waiver, is adopted to benefit the insured motorist, and should not be 
construed to relieve insurers of primary responsibility or to benefit them in any way. Any 
construction of the statutes must be done liberally in favor of coverage, with strict and 
narrow construction given to exclusions. Accordingly, State Farm cannot dictate the 
basis on which policies will be considered 'new' or 'renewal' based on their own internal 
procedures and classification. An appropriate construction of the statute requires that the 
replacement policy covering the PT Cruiser be considered a new policy of insurance 
which did not exist prior to its creation in April of 2003. Accordingly, because it was a 
new policy and because State Farm did not obtain a written waiver, the UIM coverage 
must equal the liability limits. 
IV. VEHICLE CHANGES, A CHANGE IN THE POLICY ITSELF AND 
STATE FARM'S ADMISSION TO MATERIAL CHANGES SHOW THE 
COVERAGE FOR THE IVERSONS TO BE NEW, NOT RENEWAL. 
When significant changes occur to a policy, courts find that the subsequent policy 
is new and not a mere renewal. In Arms v. State Farm Mut Auto, Ins. Co., the court 
confronted an issue strikingly similar to that in this case. The insured had purchased 
several vehicles over the life of the relationship with his insurer, State Farm. In Arms 
27 
state statutory law imposed "the duty to offer to its insured the option to purchase 
additional uninsured motorist coverage."35 Similar to this case, the statutory scheme 
provided that "where the policy in issue is a renewal policy and the option to purchase 
additional coverage has been articulated by the insurer when issuing the original policy, 
no subsequent offer is required by the statute."36 Just as in this case, State Farm "seized 
upon" the renewal exception.37 Accordingly, the court found that the issue, as here, 
"reduces itself to whether or not the policy in effect at the time of the collision was a 
renewal of prior coverage."38 
Also there as here, the insured had replaced his vehicle on three separate 
occasions. State Farm contended that the issuance of a policy for each vehicle was 
"merely a renewal of the initial coverage; therefore, the duty to offer the option to 
plaintiff did not attach beyond the offer made in connection with the purportedly original 
policy."39 The court rejected this argument and agreed with the insured that the 
subsequent policies were "replacement and, therefore, [the insured] should have been 
offered the option of increasing his uninsured motorist limits." The outcome should be 
no different in this case. State Farm themselves characterized the policies as 
'replacement6 and the changes reflect the fact that their policies with the Iversons were 
35










not mere renewals. Therefore, under Utah's statutory scheme, State Farm should have 
obtained a written waiver electing to maintain the lower UIM coverage. 
Similarly, a Hawaii court considered even a few changes, such as a change to the 
named insured and a newly acquired vehicle, to be 'material.' Based on public policy, 
removing and replacing the named insured and adding a vehicle, "taken together, 
constituted a material change to the pre-existing policy... and, therefore, Allstate was 
required to make a new offer of UM/UIM coverage."40 The multitude of changes in this 
case involved changes in principal driver, vehicles, and even issuance of a new Policy 
Booklet Form. Certainly these changes present material changes sufficient to trigger the 
requirement that State Farm obtain a written waiver because the policy is no longer a 
'renewal9 of a prior policy. 
The numerous changes over the 24 years of providing insurance to the Iversons 
represent material and significant changes both cumulatively and standing on their own. 
However, State Farm's corporate representative admitted that the change in principal 
drivers was a material change as reflected by the change in pricing. State Farm's 
corporate representative also admitted that changes in pricing reflect material changes to 
the policy. If the change "impact[s] the pricing, [i]t could have potential. Q: So it could 
be a material change? A: Right. Q:... [T]hat would be reflected by the documents, 
wouldn't it? A: Yes." (R. 235, 254-255). 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaneshiro, 998 P.2d 490 (Hawaii 2000) 
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The documents reflect that the change in vehicles altered the pricing and, by Ms. 
Chase's definition of material, therefore constitutes a material change in the insurance. In 
February of 2003 the total premium for the 1995 Chevy Van was $277.20. (R. 261). Yet, 
after replacing #479 7848-804-44E, the policy covering the Chevy Van, with #479 
7848-804-44F, the policy covering the PT Cruiser, the pricing jumped to $379.00. (R. 
119). Despite these admittedly material changes, State Farm failed to obtain a written 
waiver for the lower UIM limits. 
State Farm wrote two new policies following the 2001 legislation. First, State 
Farm wrote a new policy to reflect the narrowing of coverage offered under their new 
Policy Booklet Form. Second, State Farm wrote a new policy to provide coverage for the 
2001 PT Cruiser. State Farm must admit the materiality of both the alteration of the basic 
agreement and contract for insurance as well as the issuance of coverage for the PT 
Cruiser. If either of these events were immaterial,' State Farm would not issue coverage 
at different premiums to reflect the change in risk insured or cause the policy number to 
change. In short, both events constitute material and significant departures from the prior 
policy as reflected by State Farm's own handling of each event, namely issuance of a new 
policy to reflect the event as well as an alteration to the pricing of the policy. 
The coverage at issue in this case came about as a result of issuing a policy of 
insurance in April 2003. State Farm offers no evidence that the insureds waived the 
higher limits. Accordingly, it is appropriate to require that the UIM coverage in this case 
equal the liability limits of $50,000/$ 100,000. 
30 
Conclusion 
Because State Farm's own documentation characterizes Policy #479 
7848-804-44F as a 'replacement' policy, because that policy did not exist on January 1, 
2001 and because the policy changed in several material respects, State Farm must obtain 
a written waiver for the higher UIM limits. State Farm offers no real explanation as to 
how a policy covering a 2001 PT Cruiser and written for the first time in April 2003 can 
be characterized as a 'renewal' a policy "then existing" in January of 2001. The sum of 
changes affected the pricing on the policy and involved rating aspects of underwriting as 
admitted by Ms. Chase. 
Utah law requires insurers to provide UIM limits equivalent to the liability limits 
on a policy unless a written waiver is obtained from the insured. There is only a single 
and very narrow exception to the mandate that UIM limits equal liability limits - that 
exception only applies to a policy of insurance existing on January 1, 2001. Because the 
policy at issue came into existence in April of 2003, State Farm must demonstrate they 
obtained a waiver of higher UIM from the Iversons. State Farm offers no written waiver. 
Further, the undisputed facts in this case show that the policy covering the Iversons in 
2005 for their 2001 PT Cruiser was not a mere renewal of the same policy governing the 
Iversons 1981 Firebird and written in 1981. Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests 
that State Farm be required to provide the UIM equaling the liability limits in this case as 
mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305. 
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UTST§31A-22-305 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953§31A-22-305 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 22. CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 
PART III. MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 
Copyright © 1953-2001 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
31A-22-305 Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. 
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes: 
(a) the named insured; 
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or 
guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household, including those 
who usually make their home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere; 
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle referred to in the policy or 
owned by a self-insurer; and 
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or operat-
or of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury to or 
death of persons under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c). 
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes: 
(a) (i) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not covered 
under a liability policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence; or 
(ii) (A) a vehicle covered with lower liability limits than required by Sec-
tion 31A-22-304; 
(B) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(a)(ii)(A) is uninsured to the ex-
tent of the deficiency; 
(b) an unidentified vehicle that left the scene of an accident proximately 
caused by the vehicle operator; 
(c) a vehicle covered by a liability policy, but coverage for an accident is 
disputed by the liability insurer for more than 60 days or, beginning with the ef-
fective date of this act, continues to be disputed for more than 60 days; or 
(d) (i) an insured vehicle if, before or after the accident, the liability in-




(ii) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is uninsured only to the 
extent that the claim against the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty as-
sociation or fund. 
(3) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(b) provides 
coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages from own-
ers or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, 
disease, or death. 
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of unin-
sured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the in-
sured' s motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist cover-
age limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, un-
less the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an acknowledg-
ment form provided by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase uninsured motor-
ist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor 
vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits 
available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are less than 
the minimum bodily injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under Sec-
tion 31A-22-304. 
(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection (3)(b) continues for that issuer of 
the uninsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, requests different 
uninsured motorist coverage from the insurer. 
(e) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January 
1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the 
same medium as the premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of unin-
sured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the coverage in 
amounts up to and including the maximum amount available by the insurer under the 
insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry uninsured motor-
ist coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor vehicle liability 
policy limits or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits available by the 
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(4) (a) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), the named insured may re-




provides liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(a). 
(ii) This rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that includes 
a reasonable explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage. 
(iii) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage un-
til the insured in writing requests uninsured motorist coverage from that liabil-
ity insurer. 
(b) (i) All persons, including governmental entities, that are engaged in the 
business of, or that accept payment for, transporting natural persons by motor 
vehicle, and all school districts that provide transportation services for their 
students, shall provide coverage for all vehicles used for that purpose, by pur-
chase of a policy of insurance or by self-insurance, uninsured motorist coverage 
of at least $25,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. 
(ii) This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an injured 
covered person. 
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage: 
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' 
Compensation Act; 
(ii) may not be subrogated by the Workers' Compensation insurance carrier; 
(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' Compensation 
insurance; and 
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the covered 
person has been made whole. 
(d) As used in this Subsection (4): 
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning as under Section 63-30- 2. 
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under Section 41-la-102. 
(5) When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor vehicle under Subsec-
tion (2)(b) proximately caused an accident without touching the covered person or 
the vehicle occupied by the covered person, the covered person must show the ex-
istence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and convincing evidence consisting 
of more than the covered person's testimony. 
(6) (a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage for two or more 
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine the 
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident. 




defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii). 
(ii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii) is entitled to 
the highest limits of uninsured motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle 
that the covered person is the named insured or an insured family member. 
(iii) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the 
covered person is occupying. 
(iv) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against 
the other. 
(c) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall be 
primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under Subsections 
(l)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage. 
(7) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death of covered persons while occupying or using a motor 
vehicle only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a claim 
is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle 
covered under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in Subsection (6) or 
(7), a covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy that includes un-
insured motorist benefits may not elect to collect uninsured motorist coverage be-
nefits from any other motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is a covered 
person. 
(b) Each of the following persons may also recover uninsured motorist benefits 
under any other policy in which they are described as a "covered person" as 
defined in Subsection (1): 
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor vehicle; 
and 
(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that 
is not owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the covered per-
son, the covered person's resident spouse, or the covered person's resident relat-
ive. 
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7)(b) is not barred against making sub-
sequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections. 
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a 
vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a liability 
policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has insufficient li-
ability coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all special and general 
damages. 




(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the same 
policy that also contains the underinsured motorist coverage; or 
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (2). 
(9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(c) 
provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages 
from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death. 
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of under-
insured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the in-
sured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist cov-
erage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, 
unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an acknowledg-
ment form provided by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase underinsured mo-
torist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's mo-
tor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage lim-
its available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are less 
than $10,000 for one person in any one accident and at least $20,000 for two or 
more persons in any one accident. 
(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection (9)(b) continues for that issuer of 
the underinsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, requests differ-
ent underinsured motorist coverage from the insurer. 
(e) The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as described in Sub-
section (9)(a), is secondary to the liability coverage of an owner or operator of 
an underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection (8). Underinsured motor-
ist coverage may not be set off against the liability coverage of the owner or op-
erator of an underinsured motor vehicle, but shall be added to, combined with, or 
stacked upon the liability coverage of the owner or operator of the underinsured 
motor vehicle to determine the limit of coverage available to the injured person. 
(f) (i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by an ex-
press writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage under Subsection 
31A-22-302(l)(a). 
(ii) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that 




and when it would be applicable. 
(iii) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage un-
til the insured in writing requests underinsured motorist coverage from that liab-
ility insurer, 
(g) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January 
1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the 
same medium as the premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of under-
insured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the coverage in 
amounts up to and including the maximum amount available by the insurer under the 
insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry underinsured mo-
torist coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor vehicle liabil-
ity policy limits or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available 
by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(10) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily in-
jury, sickness, disease, or death of an insured while occupying or using a motor 
vehicle owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the insured, a 
resident spouse, or resident relative of the insured, only if the motor vehicle is 
described in the policy under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a 
newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. Ex-
cept as provided in this Subsection (10), a covered person injured in a vehicle 
described in a policy that includes underinsured motorist benefits may not elect 
to collect underinsured motorist coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle 
insurance policy under which he is a named insured. 
(b) (i) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or 
more motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine 
the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one acci-
dent. 
(ii) Subsection (10)(b)(i) applies to all persons except a covered person as 
defined under Subsection (10)(d)(i)(B). 
(iii) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall 
be primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under Subsec-
tions (l)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage. 
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage: 
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' 
Compensation Act; 




(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' Compensation 
insurance; and 
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the covered 
person has been made whole. 
(d) (i) Each of the following persons may also recover underinsured motorist 
coverage benefits under any other policy in which they are described as a "covered 
person" as defined under Subsection (1): 
(A) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an underinsured motor 
vehicle; or 
(B) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that is 
not owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the covered person, 
the covered person's resident spouse, or the covered person's resident relative. 
(ii) This coverage shall only be available as a secondary source of coverage. 
(iii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (10)(d)(i)(B) is entitled 
to the highest limits of underinsured motorist coverage afforded for any one 
vehicle that the covered person is the named insured or an insured family member. 
(iv) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the 
covered person is occupying. 
(v) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against the 
other. 
(e) A covered injured person is not barred against making subsequent elections 
if recovery is unavailable under previous elections. 
(11) A claim may not be brought by a covered person against a motor vehicle un-
derinsured motorist policy more than three years after the date of the last liab-
ility policy payment. 
(12) (a) Within five business days after notification in a manner specified by 
the department that all liability insurers have tendered their liability policy 
limits, the underinsured carrier shall either: 
(i) waive any subrogation claim the underinsured carrier may have against the 
person liable for the injuries caused in the accident; or 
(ii) pay the insured an amount equal to the policy limits tendered by the li-
ability carrier. 
(b) If neither option is exercised under Subsection (12)(a), the subrogation 




History: C. 1953, 31A-22-305, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 
157; 1987, ch. 162, § 1; 1992, ch. 1, § 4; 1992, ch. 132, § 3; 1993, ch. 271, § 2; 
1994, ch. 316, § 15; 1995, ch. 294, § 1; 1996, ch. 240, § 12; 1997, ch. 375, § 14; 
1999, ch. 158, § 1; 2000, ch. 188, § 1; 2001, ch. 59, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. — T h e 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, designated Subsec-
tion (6)(a) and added Subsections (6)(b) and (6)(c); substituted "Subsection (6) 
or (7)" for "Subsection (7)(b)" in the second sentence of Subsection (7)(a); added 
Subsections (10)(b)(ii) through (c)(v) and made related changes; redesignated 
former Subsection (10)(c) as (10)(d) and deleted the first sentence authorizing 
elections of underinsured motorist coverage under specified circumstances; and 
made stylistic changes. 
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 35A, Chapter 3" 
for "Title 35, Chapter 1" in Subsection (4)(b)(ii) and added "(10)" in Subsections 
(10)(b)(ii) and (10)(c)(iii). 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 34A, Chapter 2" 
for "Title 35A, Chapter 3" in Subsection (4)(b)((ii). 
The 1999 amendment, effective March 18, 1999, added Subsection (2)(c), redesig-
nating former Subsection (2)(c) as (2)(d), and made related and stylistic changes 
in the section. 
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, added Subsections (3)(b) to (3)(e), 
(4)(a)(ii), (4)(c)(ii) to (4)(c)(iv), (9)(b) to (9)(d), (9)(f)(ii), (10)(c), and 
(11), and made related changes; deleted "For new policies or contracts written 
after January 1, 1993" from the beginning of Subsection (9)(f)(i); rewrote Subsec-
tion (9)(g), revising the provisions for notice and disclosure; and made stylistic 
changes. 
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, corrected a subsection reference 
in Subsection (10)(b)(ii) and added Subsection (12). 
Compiler's Notes. — T h e phrase "the effective date of this act" in Subsection 
(2)(c) means March 18, 1999, the effective date of Laws 1999, ch. 158, which added 
that subsection. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Construction with other statutes. 
The Workers' Compensation Act is not the exclusive remedy for injured employees 
who seek to recover from someone who is not their employer, or an officer, agent, 
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Non-owned car does not Include a car: 
1. Which is not in the lawful possession of the 
person operating it; or 
2. Which has been operated by, rented by or 
in the possession of an insured during any part 
of each of the preceding 21 days; or 
3. Operated by an insured who has operated 
or rented any car otherwise qualifying as a 
non-owned car during any part of more than 
45 days in the 365 days preceding the date of 
the accident or loss. 
(R. 356). 
excluded coverage "while operating or 
occupying a motor vehicle owned by you, your 
spouse or any relative if it is not insured for 




Non-owned car does not include a: 
1. rented car while it is used in connection with 
the insured's employment or business; or 
2. car which has been operated or rented by or 
in the possession of an insured during any part 
of each of the last 21 or more consecutive days. 
If the insured is an insured under one or more 
other car policies issued by us, the 21 day limit 
is increased by an additional 21 days for each 
such additional policy. 
A Non-owned car must be a car in lawful 
possession of the person operating. 
(R.381). 
excludes coverage "while operating or 
occupying a motorcycle." (R. 389). Paragraph 
3 
goes on to exclude "coverage under this policy 
for bodily injury to any person who is injured. 
a. While occupying a motor vehicle which is 
(1) owned by or furnished for the regular use of 
you or any relative; and 
(2) not insured for no-fault coverage under this 
policy. 
b. When struck by a motor vehicle which is 
(1) owned by the injured person, and 
(2) not insured for no-fault coverage under this 
policy. 
(Id.). I 
If the insured elects to pursue arbitration the 
policy now eliminates attorney fees. "An 
insured is not entitled to attorney fees if the 
i insured elects arbitration as provided for by this 
policy." This language is missing in policy 






Newly Acquired Car - means a car newly 
owned by you or your spouse if it: 
1. Replaces your car; or 
2. Is an added car and: 
a. If it is a private passenger car, we 
insure all other private passenger cars, or 
b. If it is other than a private 
passenger car, we insure all cars 
owned by you and your spouse on the date of 
its delivery to you or your spouse; 
but only if you or your spouse: 
1. Tell us about it within 30 days after its 
delivery to you or your spouse and 
2. If you or your spouse has more than one of 
our car policies tell us which one is to apply; 
and 




Newly Acquired Car - means a replacement car 
or an additional car. 
Replacement Car- means a car newly owned by 
or newly leased to you or your spouse that 
replaces your car. This policy will only provide 
coverage for the replacement car if you or your 
spouse: 
1. Ask us to insure it within 30 days after its 
delivery to you or your spouse; and 
2. Pay us any added amount due. 
Additional car - means an added car newly 
owned by or newly leased to you or your 
spouse this policy will only provide coverage for 
the additional car you: 
1. It is a private passenger car and we insure 
all other private passenger cars; or 
2. It is other than a private passenger car and 
we insure all cars 
owned by or leased to you or your spouse on 
the date of its delivery to you or your spouse. 
This policy provides coverage for the additional 
car only until the earlier of: 
1. 12:01 a.m. standard time at the address 
shown on the declarations page on the 31st day 
after the delivery of the car to you or your 
spouse; or 
2. The effective date and time of a policy issued 
by us or any other company that describes the 
car on its declarations page. 
You or your spouse may apply for a policy that 
will provide coverage beyond the 30th day for 
the additional car. Such policy will be issued 
only if both the applicant and the vehicle are 
eligible for coverage of the time of application. 
If the newly acquired car is not otherwise 
afforded comprehensive or collision coverage 
by this or any other policy, this policy will 
provide the comprehensive or collision 
coverage not otherwise provided for the newly 
acquired car. If such coverage is provided by 
this paragraph it will apply only until 12:01 a.m. 
standard Time at the address shown on the 
declarations page on the sixth day after the 
delivery of the car to you or your spouse. Any 
comprehensive or collision coverage provided 









Right of State Farm to cancel. Policy number 
9844.4 includes new language that "the mailing 
of the notice shall be sufficient proof of 





Means "bodily injury to a person and sickness, 




Means "physical bodily injury to a person and 
sickness, disease or death which results from it. 
A person does not sustain bodily injury if that 
person suffers emotional distress in the 
absence of physical bodily injury." (R. 380). 
